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REVISITED SERIES
In the Revisited Series, Local Government Studies oﬀers short updates of
some of the journal’s most cited articles of recent years. In these updates,
the authors reﬂect on changes since their original contribution, whilst
underlining the continuing relevance of the thinking behind the latter and
indicating the direction in which this could be extended in the future.
Here, Raymond Gradus, Elbert Dijkgraaf and Martijn Schoute revisit an
article Gradus and Dijkgraaf wrote for LGS Vol 33 No 4: ‘Collusion in the
Dutch Waste Collection Market’, in which they found that in 2002, collusion
among providers of waste collection in the Netherlands produced a high
degree of concentration in the market, which increased costs and (partly)
oﬀset the advantage of contracting out the service. Here, Gradus, Dijkgraaf
and Martijn Schoute take a look at the degree of concentration in the Dutch
waste collection market in 2010, and at what had happened to the cost
advantage of private provision.
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ABSTRACT
Concentration indexes based on regional markets show that the Dutch market
for refuse collection is highly concentrated in 2002 and 2010. Similar to earlier
work in 2007, the results indicate some evidence that high concentration
increases costs and therefore (partly) oﬀsets the advantage of contracting
out. In 2002, results with respect to concentration are somewhat less robust.
In 2010, the cost-advantage eﬀect of private provision becomes smaller.
However, for this year, we have a stronger indication that the cost advantage
of private provision depends negatively on regional concentration measured
by the Hirschman–Herﬁndahl Index.
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Introduction
In 2007, a special issue of Local Government Studies on ‘Local Government
Reform: Privatisation and Its Alternatives’ was published. The papers col-
lected in this volume explored what factors cause local governments in
North America and Europe to privatise or not and showed that ‘privatisation
is by no means a panacea’. As part of this special issue, the degree of
concentration in the Dutch waste collection market was explored, and the
eﬀect of concentration on costs was estimated (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus
(2007)). It was shown that the Dutch waste collection sector exhibits sig-
niﬁcant market concentration that is associated with higher total costs and
may reﬂect collusion. Empirically, it was presented that savings with tender-
ing are signiﬁcantly higher if the regional market is competitive. In addition,
private ﬁrms are more cost-eﬀective when public (i.e., municipality-owned)
ﬁrms operate in the same territorial area.
Nevertheless, the current evidence for cost savings from contracting out
or private provision is more mixed. In an overview article, Bel, Fageda, and
Warner (2010) conduct a meta-regression analysis, mostly based on the
refuse collection literature, and show that there is no unambiguous evi-
dence for obtaining signiﬁcant cost savings from private production. The
literature has increasingly turned its attention to factors that might under-
mine savings from contracting out, such as hefty transaction costs (Brown
and Potoski 2005) and market concentration (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007). As
contracting out refuse collection is a dynamic process, with sometimes a
more competitive and sometimes a more monopolistic market structure (see
also Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2008a)), in this article we give an update for 2010
and compare this with the results for 2002. We include, compared with the
former study, a slightly diﬀerent and improved measure for concentration.
The relation between concentration and costs
In the work by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007), the factors which determine
the total costs of refuse collection in Dutch municipalities for the year
2002 were analysed. This study used the same approach as employed by
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) to explain total costs of refuse collection at
the municipal level: total costs is dependent on the number of collection
points (measured by the number of households), density of collection
points, household size, characteristics of recycling and mode of produc-
tion (private ﬁrm, public ﬁrm,1 inter-municipal cooperation or in-house
production). According to this estimation, private collection was 17%
cheaper than collection by municipalities. This result is in accordance
with earlier results found by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003). Moreover, the
diﬀerence between collection by public ﬁrms or inter-municipal
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cooperation and collection by the municipality itself was small and
insigniﬁcant.2 Moreover, a series of concentration indicators at the pro-
vincial level were included to analyse the extent to which the strength of
competition aﬀects the impact of contracting out on costs. The concen-
tration indicators used were the Hirschman–Herﬁndahl index (HHI), the
C3-ratio (the market share of the three largest companies) and the pre-
sence of competitors (private or public) in municipalities within the same
geographical area. Some evidence to suggest that cost savings with
contracting out depended on the degree of concentration at the provin-
cial level was found: the higher the concentration, the lower the cost
savings associated with contracting out.3 In addition, we took into
account that in the Netherlands contracting out may involve both public
and private companies and found that the presence of public (but not
private) companies as competitors in neighbouring municipalities seemed
to have a positive eﬀect on the cost savings achieved with contracting
out. In the work by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2008b), also data for the year
2006 were included. Interestingly, the positive relation between concen-
tration and prices was now highly signiﬁcant, which strengthened our
case that the costs of private provision are increasingly dependent on
regional concentration.
The Dutch waste collection market in 2010
Let us ﬁrst describe the market in 2010 and compare it with 2002. In 2010, 16
private and 25 public ﬁrms were active in the Netherlands. This is remarkably
diﬀerent from 2002 with 25 private and 12 public ﬁrms. The share of munici-
palities using private ﬁrms decreased from 37% in 2002 to 33% in 2010 and the
share of public ﬁrms increased from 18% in 2002 to 34% in 2010. Also, in 2010,
there were only two private companies that served more than nine municipa-
lities. But while the largest company (i.e. SITA) had a contract with 87 munici-
palities in 2002, this was only 53 in 2010. For van Gansewinkel the number of
municipalities slightly decreased from 42 in 2002 to 40 in 2010. For
Afvalverwerking Rijnmond (AVR), a public ﬁrm in 2002 and privatised in 2006,
the decreasewas larger from22 to 8. Interestingly, the number ofmunicipalities
using public ﬁrms increased substantially from 87 in 2002 to 146 in 2010.
Although the market share of public ﬁrms had increased in 2010, there seem
to be fewer reasons to think that public ﬁrms behave as competitors for private
ﬁrms in local waste contracts. Besides the privatised AVR, most of the public
ﬁrms already existing in 2002 only served the municipalities that own the
shares of these ﬁrms in 2010.4 Therefore, there is less reason to assume that
public ﬁrms are involved in a tender.
Before 2002, due to (past) Dutch legislation, there was evidence that the
relevant market was the province. However, today there is reasoning to
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assume that the relevant market is a circle around a municipality as waste
policy is no longer at the provincial but national level. In this article, we
calculate for 2002 and 2010 the HHI-index for an area with a radius of 30
kilometres (i.e., 18.6 miles) or 50 kilometres (i.e., 31.1 miles).5 We calculate
the HHI-index as the sum of the squared market shares of private
companies.6 Furthermore, we calculate the C3 ratio, an alternative measure
for concentration, which is deﬁned by the sum of the market shares of the
three largest private companies in the relevant market. Table 1 contains the
descriptive statistics for these variables.
Based on these HHI’s and C3’s, we conclude that the Dutch waste collec-
tion market is still highly concentrated. Compared with a value of 0.18 used
by the US Antitrust Division to indicate concentrated markets, nearly all
markets are concentrated indeed (see Shepherd (1997)). If the relevant
market has a radius of 50 kilometres, the average HHI-index for private
competitors is 0.46 in 2002 and 0.39 in 2010.7 Notice that the concentration
is not evenly spread over the country. Some municipalities have only one
private collection ﬁrm in their neighbourhood whereas others have many.8 If
the relevant market is 30 kilometres, the average HHI-index is higher with
0.56 in 2002 and 0.50 in 2010. For C3 a similar picture occurs, although this
concentration ratio is higher than HHI. It should be noticed that in 2010 the
concentration indexes are somewhat lower than in 2002.
Estimations
Table 2 presents our estimation results for 2002 and 2010.9 First, we
estimate the basic model without a concentration eﬀect (see ﬁrst col-
umn). Second, we include HHI for 30 or 50 kilometres (see second and
third column). Third, we include C3 ratios for 30 or 50 kilometres (see
fourth and ﬁfth column). In these estimations, we multiply HHI and C3
indexes by the private ownership dummy as we are interested in the
eﬀects of concentrated markets on the behaviour of private ﬁrms.10
According to the ﬁrst column, private collection was 22% cheaper in 2002
and 10% in 2010 than collection by municipalities, although this 2010-
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for concentration indexes.
Average Std dev min max N
2002 HHI30 0.56 0.22 0.17 1.0 453
HHI50 0.46 0.20 0.17 1.0 453
C3-30 0.95 0.08 0.60 1.0 453
C3-50 0.90 0.08 0.60 1.0 453
2010 HHI30 0.50 0.25 0.19 1.0 392
HHI50 0.39 0.21 0.16 1.0 392
C3-30 0.93 0.09 0.68 1.0 392
C3-50 0.86 0.10 0.58 1.0 392
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coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.11,12 In addition, in line with Dijkgraaf and Gradus
(2007), collection by a public ﬁrm or an inter-municipal cooperation is not
signiﬁcantly cheaper than collection by municipalities.13 For 2002, the estima-
tions for the concentration eﬀect are similar to Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007), if
we take regional HHI50 instead of HHI based on provinces.14 Let us explicate
the working of this index. At the average value of the HHI50 index, i.e., 0.46,
the net eﬀect of private provision on collection costs is now −22%. When a
monopoly is present (implying a HHI of 1), total costs decrease with 3%
compared with municipal collection. At the other hand, the results imply
that the cost advantage of private collection might be much higher if enough
competition is present as a Herﬁndahl index of zero results in an estimated
cost decrease of 37%. For HHI30 and C3’s, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects
anymore. A possible explanation for C3’s can be the rather low standard
deviations.
Interestingly, private collection becomes signiﬁcant in 2010, if we take
into account the concentration of regional markets. For HHI30 and HHI50 we
even ﬁnd stronger eﬀects that the cost advantage of private provision is
oﬀset by regional concentration than for 2002. When a monopoly is present
(implying a HHI of 1), total costs increase (with 22–23%) compared with
municipal collection. For C3’s, we get more mixed results.
Discussion
If we compare the results of a former Local Government Studies paper with the
results for 2010, there is still some indication that highly concentrated regional
markets, especially measured with a HHI-index, result in barriers for local
governments to eﬀectively obtain beneﬁts from contracting out. Although
these results are appealing, they should be interpreted with caution, because
data for the private side of the market are only available for 2002 and 2010 and
we use cross-sectional analyses. Cross-sections have their limitations as the
complexity of competition issues ideally involves data analysis over time. Based
Table 2. Estimation results: eﬀect on total costs of waste collection.
2002 Basic model HHI30 HHI50 C3-30 C3-50
Collection inter-municipal coop. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Collection public ﬁrm 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Collection private ﬁrm −0.09*** −0.14*** −0.16*** −0.15 −0.26***
Concentration eﬀect 0.09 0.15** 0.07 0.18
2010 Basic model HHI30 HHI50 C3-30 C3-50
Collection inter-municipal coop. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Collection public ﬁrm 0.04 0.04* 0.04 0.04* 0.04
Collection private ﬁrm −0.04 −0.13*** −0.11*** −0.33** −0.10
Concentration eﬀect 0.21** 0.20** 0.33** 0.08
*/**/*** means signiﬁcant at the 10%/5%/1% level.
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on panel data, some authors have stressed the dynamic and the complex
pattern of the waste collection market. Analysing compulsory competitive
tendering (CCT) in the UK, Szymanski (1996) shows that contracting out yields
cost advantages, but that there is some indication that cost advantages
become smaller in the second round of tendering.15 It seems that local infor-
mation is important, which gives the incumbent an advantage above new
entrants. If panel data become available, it would be worthwhile to investigate
the dynamic relation in these markets further.
Another issue is the use of the HHI’s. In his seminal IO-textbook,
Shepherd (1997, p. 342) describes US trash removal as a typical case
study of tight collusion with a high market share of two private companies
(i.e., BFI and WMX) and that ‘eﬀective competition in it may simply not be
viable’. Interestingly, the Netherlands has a similar structure and the widely
used Hirschman–Herﬁndahl index is a nice way to capture this phenom-
enon as it is mostly determined by the largest ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the
market size of the largest ﬁrm in the Netherlands, i.e., SITA, has become
smaller if we compare 2010 with 2002. Therefore, in future work it is
worthwhile to investigate other concentration indexes as well. Ginevičius
and Čirba (2009) show some other concentration indexes, but emphasise
that all have their weaknesses and their strengths as a measure for
competition.
Conclusions
In this article, we calculate concentration indexes based on regional markets
and show that the Dutch market for refuse collection is highly concentrated
in 2002 and 2010. Furthermore, similar to Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007), we
use these concentration indexes to evaluate the relation between costs,
concentration and the institutional mode. For 2002, the relation between
costs and concentration is less robust, but for 2010 we ﬁnd some more
evidence that regional concentration oﬀsets the advantage of contracting
out. If we compare the estimation results between 2002 and 2010, two
trends emerge. First, the cost-advantage eﬀect of private provision seems
to become smaller in 2010. Second, for 2010 we have a stronger indication
that the cost advantage of private provision depends negatively on regional
concentration measured by HHI. Therefore, data for recent years should be
investigated, on whether these trends are continuing. This makes it also
possible to use panel data, which is an improvement as in that case ﬁxed-
eﬀects can be applied. Finally, it can be worthwhile to investigate other
measures for concentration as well.
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Notes
1. It should be noted that these public ﬁrms operate under Dutch commercial
law, while their shares are owned by municipalities.
2. In the work by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007), two estimations for public ﬁrms
were included (one with and one without reducing the 2002-costs of public
companies for VAT). In the latter case, presented here, the coeﬃcient for
public companies was insigniﬁcant and all other coeﬃcients are the same
(see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007, footnote 13)).
3. The results for other variables were in line with results found by Dijkgraaf and
Gradus (2003). The coeﬃcient for number of collection points was somewhat
lower than 1, but a Wald test of coeﬃcient restrictions did not falsify the
constant returns to scale hypothesis. This in line with, for example, Bel and
Costas (2006).
4. We checked this for two large public ﬁrms (i.e., Omrin and ROVA), and others
stayed more or less constant with respect to the number of municipalities.
5. We thank Jaap Boter (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) for calculating (using
ArcGIS) the mutual distances among (the household-weighted centres of) all
Dutch municipalities for us.
6. The total market in such a case was deﬁned as the number of households
which was treated by private companies in a region with a stray of 30 kilo-
metres or 50 kilometres around a municipality.
7. It should be noticed that not all Dutch municipalities have private companies
within 30 or 50 kilometres. Similar to the work by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007),
we assume that in such a case the concentration indexes HHI and C3 are equal
to one, which can be interpreted as no competition.
8. In 2010, the minimum for HHI50 is 0.16 and in 2002 the minimum is 0.17,
which can be interpreted as approximately six private companies of equal size
competing within 50 kilometres.
9. We present only the estimations for the institutional dummy and the concen-
tration indexes. Results for other variables are available upon request.
10. From an econometric point of view, one can argue that the main eﬀect should
be included in the regressions as well. As results (which are available upon
request) are similar, we do not present them here.
11. As the estimations are in logs, the eﬀect can be calculated using ex–1 and by
multiplying this by 2.5 as collection costs are on average 40% of total waste
costs.
12. It should be noted that the 2002 data and the model used here are slightly
diﬀerent from the data and the model used by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007) as
we include provincial dummies instead of dummies for which incineration
plants municipalities use and we have a diﬀerent deﬁnition of HHI.
13. This result is thus diﬀerent from Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013), where inter-
municipal cooperation has become the most cost-advantage alternative. It
should be noted that this estimation is based on a large panel data set
(1998–2010) and includes municipal ﬁxed eﬀects.
14. In the work by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007), based on HHI and C3 for pro-
vinces, signiﬁcant eﬀects for HHI (at 10% level) and for C3 (at 5% level) of the
same magnitude were found.
15. Szymanski (1996) was among the ﬁrst to use a large panel data set to analyse
the waste collection market.
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